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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
    
 
Nos. 19-2158 and 19-2260 
    
 
JOHN DOE, 




ST. JOSEPH’S UNIVERSITY; JANE ROE 
 
St. Joseph’s University, 
Appellant in No. 19-2260 
    
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(No. 2-18-cv-02044) 
District Judge: Hon. Paul S. Diamond 
    
 
Submitted pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
January 24, 2020 
 
Before: AMBRO, MATEY, and ROTH, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion filed: October 27, 2020) 
    
 
OPINION 
    
 
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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MATEY, Circuit Judge. 
 After St. Joseph’s University (SJU) found John Doe responsible for sexual assault, 
Doe sued, arguing that the investigation violated his rights under Title IX. The District 
Court granted summary judgment for SJU, prompting this appeal. Because Doe has not 
presented evidence of bias “on the basis of sex,” and because the additional discovery he 
seeks is protected by attorney-client privilege, we will affirm. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 In February 2018, Doe and Jane Roe—both SJU students—had a sexual encounter 
in Doe’s dorm. A few days later, Roe told SJU’s Title IX Coordinator, Dr. Mary-Elaine 
Perry, that Doe squeezed her neck forcefully during their time together without her consent. 
In response, the school appointed an outside attorney to investigate.  
 After interviewing Doe and Roe, the investigator found that Doe “put his hand 
around [Roe’s] throat and squeezed her neck area” without consent during the incident, 
which “left bruises.” (App. at 1986–87.) The investigator therefore concluded that Doe was 
“responsible” for sexual assault, as that term was defined in the school’s Sexual 
Misconduct Policy. (App. at 1987–88.) As a result, SJU placed Doe on disciplinary 
probation. 
 Doe then sued SJU, asserting that the proceedings against him were infected with 
sex bias, in violation of Title IX. After discovery, the District Court held that there was 
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insufficient evidence for Doe to take this claim to the jury and granted summary judgment 
for SJU.1 This appeal followed.2 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. Title IX Claims 
 “Title IX bars the imposition of university discipline where gender is a motivating 
factor in the decision to discipline.” Yusuf v. Vassar Coll., 35 F.3d 709, 715 (2d Cir. 1994). 
Doe argues that SJU’s investigation and punishment violated this statute, and he advances 
his claim under both a “selective enforcement” theory and an “erroneous outcome” theory. 
We address each in turn. 
1. Selective Enforcement 
A selective-enforcement claim asserts that, “regardless of the student’s guilt or 
innocence, the severity of the penalty and/or the decision to initiate the proceedings was 
affected by the student’s gender.” Id. To prevail under this theory, Doe must identify a 
similarly situated female student treated less harshly. See Klocke v. Univ. of Tex. at 
Arlington, 938 F.3d 204, 213 (5th Cir. 2019); cf. Doe v. Univ. of the Scis., 961 F.3d 203, 
210 n.4 (3d Cir. 2020) (female comparator and plaintiff both allegedly engaged in sexual 
 
1 Doe’s complaint also contained several state-law claims against SJU and Roe. 
After granting summary judgment on the Title IX claim, the District Court declined to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims and dismissed them without 
prejudice. The District Court also denied SJU’s counterclaim for attorneys’ fees. Neither 
decision is challenged in this appeal.  
2 The District Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment. Williams v. Sch. Dist. of Bethlehem, 998 F.2d 168, 170 (3d Cir. 1993).   
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activity without affirmative consent). To that end, Doe points to two SJU investigations 
where women were found not responsible for violating school policy. 
In the first case, a female student was investigated after requiring other female 
students to touch her bare buttocks. SJU’s investigator determined that, in part because the 
touching occurred in the context of a “team-bonding” incident, it was “not indecent,” “not 
sexual contact,” “not touching in a sexual manner,” and therefore not in violation of school 
policy. (App. at 1096–97.) In the second case, SJU received an anonymous report that a 
female staff member kissed a male student on the lips at an end-of-year luncheon. During 
the investigation, the student stated that he “was not uncomfortable,” and that the kiss was 
“a non-event,” “non-sexual,” and “not . . . unwelcomed.” (App. at 1104.) Based on these 
and other facts, SJU’s investigator found that the staff member did not violate school 
policy. 
Both cases are distinguishable. Neither involved a private romantic encounter 
leading to allegations of nonconsensual physical contact. Neither involved a victim 
alleging to have been physically harmed. And neither was initiated by a complaint from 
the alleged victim. In sum, a private, initially-consensual encounter that leads to unwanted, 
injurious sexual contact is insufficiently similar to a group hazing event or a public kiss. 
For that reason, the District Court did not err in granting summary judgment for SJU on 
Doe’s selective enforcement claim. 
 2. Erroneous Outcome 
 To prevail on an erroneous-outcome claim, a plaintiff must “cast some articulable 
doubt on the accuracy of the outcome of the disciplinary proceeding” and then show 
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“particular circumstances suggesting that gender bias was a motivating factor behind the 
erroneous finding.” Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 715. Assuming Doe has sufficiently impeached the 
accuracy of the proceedings against him, we turn to his assertions of gender bias. 
 Doe argues that the investigator was motivated by gender bias, labeling several 
aspects of her investigation “cursory.” (Opening Br. at 36.) He notes, for example, that the 
investigator interviewed no witnesses other than himself and Roe, failed to ask whether 
Roe’s memory of the evening was distorted by drug use, and declined to question Roe 
about other potential causes of her bruising. But even if these investigatory choices show 
bias, a jury would have no basis to conclude that this bias was gender motivated. See Doe 
v. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d 46, 57 (2d Cir. 2016) (noting that allegations of a shoddy 
investigation may “support the inference of bias,” but that such allegations “do not 
necessarily relate to bias on account of sex”). In other words, Doe at most satisfies only 
half of his evidentiary burden.  
 Doe also argues that Perry was motivated by gender bias, pointing to statements she 
made on a 2018 grant application. But no evidence shows that Perry played any influential 
role in the investigation or adjudication. Cf. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d at 58 (inference of 
gender bias permitted where allegedly biased individual “had significant influence, perhaps 
even determinative influence, over the University’s decision”). At most, Perry documented 
Roe’s allegations in a written complaint and transmitted that complaint to the appropriate 
school officials. But there is no evidence that Perry either encouraged Roe’s accusations or 
that the complaint misstated or exaggerated her claims. So even if we assume Perry’s 
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judgment might suffer from bias, Doe has not offered facts showing that possible bias 
impacted SJU’s investigation. 
 Finally, Doe argues that SJU’s emphasis on combatting sexual assault reflects the 
school’s gender bias. He notes, for example, that a school presentation encouraged students 
to believe and support those who claimed to be victims of sexual violence. He also notes 
that SJU had a financial incentive, in the form of a federal grant, to encourage students to 
report sexual misconduct. And he notes that SJU retained its existing sexual misconduct 
policy in the face of new guidance from the United States Department of Education. But 
all of these facts are gender neutral. The presentation, for example, contains no language 
showing that female accusers are more likely to be telling the truth, or more deserving of 
help, than male accusers. The grant doesn’t reward reports against males any more than 
reports against females. And the federal guidance does not suggest that any existing 
policies discriminated against men. While some courts have properly pointed to internal or 
external pressure when evaluating gender bias, those cases all contained indicia of specific 
intent to punish male students. See, e.g., Univ. of the Scis., 961 F.3d at 210 (gender bias 
plausibly alleged where the school, “encouraged by federal officials, ha[d] instituted 
solutions to sexual violence against women that abrogate the civil rights of men and treat 
men differently than women”); Menaker v. Hofstra Univ., 935 F.3d 20, 27 (2d Cir. 2019) 
(gender bias plausibly alleged where, among other things, the school “faced internal 
criticism for its assertedly inadequate response to male sexual misconduct on campus” 
(emphasis added)); Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 669 (7th Cir. 2019) (gender bias 
plausibly alleged where, among other facts, school-affiliated group shared an article titled 
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“Alcohol isn’t the cause of campus sexual assault. Men are.”); Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 
586 (6th Cir. 2018) (gender bias plausibly alleged where, for example, “news media 
consistently highlighted the university’s poor response to female complainants” (emphasis 
added)); Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 594 (6th Cir. 2018) (gender bias plausibly 
alleged where school was being sued by a female student for failing to expel her alleged 
attacker). As Doe does not point to evidence of similarly slanted conduct by SJU, the 
District Court did not commit error in deciding this claim.3 
B. Attorney-Client Privilege 
 During discovery, Doe moved to compel the deposition of SJU’s in-house counsel, 
Marianne Schimelfenig, about a meeting with school administrators discussing the 
Department of Education’s guidance on sexual assault.4 SJU objected on privilege grounds, 
and the District Court denied Doe’s request.5  
 Doe challenges this ruling on two grounds. First, he argues that, when asserting the 
privilege, SJU failed to “describe the nature of the . . . communications . . . not produced 
or disclosed . . . in a manner that . . . enable[d him] to assess the claim,” in violation of Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(A)(ii). In response to Doe’s motion, SJU submitted an affidavit from 
 
3 In University of the Sciences, we held that a Title IX plaintiff need not rely on a 
pre-identified theory but instead need only show “that a federally-funded college or 
university discriminated against [him] on the basis of sex.” 961 F.3d at 209. As the above 
analysis shows, Doe has not met this burden.  
4 Alternatively, Doe sought to question the administrators themselves. 
5 “We exercise plenary review over a district court’s determination on the legal 
issues underlying a claim of attorney-client privilege, and review the facts for clear error.” 




Schimelfenig stating that “[t]he entirety of the [October 2017] meeting was an 
attorney-client meeting for the purpose of providing legal advice” about complying with 
the new federal guidance. (App. at 1947.) Doe asserts that more specificity is required, 
since Schimelfenig also serves as SJU’s corporate secretary. But Schimelfenig’s affidavit 
confirms that she was attending “[i]n [her] capacity as SJU’s General Counsel” and that 
“[t]here was no business [discussed at] the meeting.” (App. at 1947.) And none of the 
evidence identified by Doe casts doubt on her assertion. 
 Second, Doe argues that SJU waived the privilege by allowing another SJU 
administrator to testify about the meeting during his deposition. It is true that disclosing 
information to a third party may waive any privilege that would otherwise attach. 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1424 (3d Cir. 1991). 
But such waiver applies “only as to those communications actually disclosed, unless a 
partial waiver would be unfair to the party’s adversary.” Id. at 1426 n.12. Here, the 
administrator’s testimony was essentially limited to stating the meeting’s purpose and the 
conclusion reached (i.e., that SJU’s then-current policies conformed to the new guidance). 
And Doe makes no argument why, given that limited disclosure, it would be unfair to 
prevent SJU from keeping the substance of that meeting’s discussion confidential. 
 The District Court, then, properly denied Doe’s motion to compel. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s orders. 
